![]() (2021) focuses on pharmaceuticals Gautier and Lamesch (2021) examine digital markets and Sokol (2021) develops an analysis of the biotech sector. The literature on killer acquisitions proceeds on an industry-specific basis. Similarly, an acquisition could hardly be labelled anti-competitive if it alleviates financial, technical, and managerial constraints faced by the target (Fumagalli et al. Some contend that classifying an acquisition as ‘killer’ would depend on whether the acquired firm had the incentive and capability to innovate absent the merger (Affeldt and Kesler 2021). Brutti and Rojas 2022 Crandall and Hazlett 2022). More equivocal conclusions are also drawn (e.g. Serial acquisitions of entrants may also dampen incentives to penetrate markets by rendering attractive certain exit strategies for entrepreneurs (Lemley and McCreary 2021), dotting high-tech landscapes with so-called ‘kill zones’ (Kamepalli et al. Such acquisitions may risk consumer harm due to anticompetitive amalgamations of data, increased prices, and reduced entry opportunities (Motta and Peitz 2021). A recurring feature is the issue of incumbents buying start-ups. The discussion on killer acquisitions revolves around a few key themes. A legitimate concern is that such transactions might remove organic sources of future competition from markets presently experiencing monopoly power. The notion describes incumbents purchasing a firm with the sole intention of terminating their operations to pre-empt competition. (2021), killer acquisitions have occupied centre stage in antitrust policy discussions. Since the inaugural paper by Cunningham et al.
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